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BRIEF FOR PETITIONER 
       
 
OPINIONS BELOW 
 The Opinion and Order of the Seventeenth Circuit (R. at 32) is unreported.  The United 
States District Court for the Northern District of West Carolina’s Opinion and Order Granting 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (R. at 27) is unreported. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 The court of appeals entered judgment on February 1, 2013.  (R. at 32.)  Petitioner filed 
his petition for writ of certiorari on February 7, 2013.  (R. at 35.)  This Court granted the petition 
on May 20, 2013.  (R. at 37.)  This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2006). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are 
reviewed for clear error.  Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED 
 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion….   
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 Since 1985, Martin County Board has maintained a practice of opening its public 
meetings with a legislative prayer.  (R. at 27.)  The purpose of the practice is to bring together 
members of the community before lawmaking commences.  (R. at 20.)  The Board’s practice is 
similar to that of Congress and many other legislative bodies throughout the country, which also 
begin public sessions with an invocation.  (R. at 18.)   
The prayer leaders selected to give invocations at Martin County Board meetings are 
volunteers from established religious congregations within Martin County.  (R. at 27-28.)  Martin 
County has approximately 283 established religious congregations, most of which are Christian.  
(R. at 28.)  Of these congregations, approximately 185 that have either participated in the prayer 
opportunity in the past or expressed an interest in doing so appear on a list maintained by the 
Board and its volunteers.  (R. at 27-28.)  The list is organized alphabetically, and each month a 
volunteer sends letters signed by the chairman to invite congregations next on the list to 
participate in an upcoming invocation.  (R. at 10.)  A leader from any congregation located 
within Martin County is welcome to volunteer to lead the prayer.  (R. at 10.)  The Board does not 
regulate or contribute to the prayers’ content, and the only instruction given to potential prayer 
leaders is that their prayers be kept under five minutes.  (R. at 28.)  The prayers are not 
incorporated into the Board’s meeting minutes but are captured in video and audio recordings 
that are archived online.  (R. at 12.)   
In April 2011, Anne Dhaliwal and her family moved to Martin County and began 
regularly attending Martin County Board meetings.  (R. at 27.)  The Dhaliwals are adherents of 
the Sikh religion, which does not preach a gospel or have a priest or leader.  (R. at 7.)  At the 
September 11, 2011, meeting, Anne Dhaliwal’s husband, Manpreet Dhaliwal, addressed 
members of the Board, saying the practice of beginning each meeting with a prayer is “nice,” but 
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the policy should be changed to “completely forbid” specific religious references, like those to 
Jesus Christ.  (R. at 7.)  Then-Chairman Benjamin Gates told Manpreet Dhaliwal the Board 
would consider his request.   
On October 20, 2011, Anne Dhaliwal sent a letter to Benjamin Gates, asking that he meet 
with the Dhaliwal family to discuss the Board’s prayer practice.  (R. at 9.)  Anne Dhaliwal wrote 
that she and her family were offended by the imposition of certain religions in the invocations 
and charged that the Board’s practice constituted a violation of her family’s First Amendment 
rights.  (R. at 9.)  Benjamin Gates did not respond to Anne Dhaliwal’s letter because of the 
Board’s policy of not responding to community concerns unless those concerns are brought up 
during a Board meeting.  (R. at 16.)  The Board maintains its response policy in an effort to 
uphold equality and fairness and to promote transparency and inclusiveness in its political 
processes.  (R. at 16.)   
 On November 25, 2011, Anne Dhaliwal filed a complaint against Martin County and the 
Martin County Board in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West 
Carolina requesting a declaratory judgment that the Board’s sponsorship of sectarian prayers 
violates the Constitution.  (R. at 11-15.)  Anne Dhaliwal also sought an injunction enjoining the 
Board from knowingly allowing sectarian prayers at board meetings and requiring the Board to 
advise its prayer givers that sectarian prayer is not permitted.  (R. at 14-15.)  The County and 
County Board filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Anne Dhaliwal failed to state an 
Establishment Clause violation for which relief could be granted.  (R. at 18-22.)  The district 
court granted Martin County and Martin County Board’s motion to dismiss.  (R. at 27-29.)  Anne 
Dhaliwal appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventeenth Circuit reversed 
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the judgment of the district court.  (R. at 32-34.)  On May 20, 2013, this Court granted Martin 
County and Martin County Board’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari.  (R. at 37-38.)  
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. In the seminal legislative prayer case of Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), 
this Court recognized legislative prayer as a time-honored tradition that does not violate the First 
Amendment’s Establishment Clause unless the prayer practice is used to proselytize or advance 
one religion over another.  The Marsh standard proscribing legislative prayers that proselytize or 
advance a religion has been interpreted differently throughout the circuits, creating a circuit split.   
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a facially neutral affiliation standard that requires a court 
to determine whether a legislative body has actively taken steps to affiliate itself with one 
religion.  Actively affiliating itself with a religion would make the legislative body’s prayer 
practice unconstitutional.  This standard allows for diversity among communities across the 
nation to flourish because a court does not have to declare a practice unconstitutional solely 
because of a prevalence of one religion’s prayers, which may result from a community’s 
demographics and not any impermissible legislative bias.  It also provides courts with an 
objective standard that can be applied consistently throughout the circuits in future legislative 
prayer cases.  The Second Circuit has taken a totality of the circumstances approach, which 
requires a court to view a prayer practice as a whole from the standpoint of a reasonable observer 
to determine whether or not the practice advances one religion over others.  This standard is 
subjective and may lead to inconsistent results throughout the circuits.  The Fourth Circuit’s 
frequency test calls for a court to review the frequency with which sectarian references are made 
to determine the constitutionality of a particular legislative prayer practice.  Use of this test, 
however, will often directly conflict with Marsh’s proscription of parsing the language of 
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legislative prayers because it requires a court to review the language of legislative prayers even 
when the prayer practice employed has not been deemed to proselytize or advance one religion 
over another.  
The facially neutral affiliation standard employed by the Ninth Circuit guards against the 
issues raised by both the totality of the circumstances test and the frequency test, and its 
endorsement and application by this Court would provide much-needed clarity to legislative 
bodies interested in creating or continuing legislative prayer practices consistent with the 
Establishment Clause. 
II. The prayer practice employed by the Martin County Board does not violate the 
Establishment Clause because the Board does not use the practice to proselytize or advance any 
one religion over another.  The Board implemented a policy open to any and all established 
religious congregations within Martin County.  The Board also proactively updated the list of 
local congregations it maintained to ensure its invitation process did not exclude a congregation 
interested in offering an invocation.  It treated volunteer clergy members equally by only 
instructing them to limit their prayers to five minutes.  No additional restrictions were placed on 
any volunteer.  Furthermore, the Board did not include the content of the offered prayers in its 
official minutes.  Excluding the prayers from the Board’s official minutes is one example of how 
the Board has actively avoided any unconstitutional endorsement or affiliation with any of the 
prayer leaders’ religious beliefs.   
Through its neutral policy, the Martin County Board purposefully avoided affiliating 
itself with any religion.  A reasonable observer viewing the practice in context would not find 
that the Board’s actions rose to the impermissible standard of proselytizing or advancing one 
religion over others.  Because the Board’s actions did not meet this threshold set out in Marsh, 
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no inquiry into the frequency of sectarian references in the prayers should be made.  Thus, 
Martin County Board’s legislative prayer practice withstands constitutional scrutiny under the 
guidelines set forth by this Court, and the Board did not violate Anne Dhaliwal’s First 
Amendment rights under whichever available legal standard this Court adopts. 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTEENTH CIRCUIT 
ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S TOTALITY OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES TEST 
 
A. Legislative prayer is a well-established, constitutionally-valid tradition 
deserving of protection. 
 
The legitimacy of legislative prayer has been acknowledged by this Court on several 
occasions.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792; Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 
573, 602 (1989); Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 346 (4th Cir. 2011).  This Court’s 
explicit recognition of legislative prayers as part of the very fabric of American society further 
illustrates the importance this Court has placed on maintaining legislative prayer practices.  See 
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.  Enjoying a unique status in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the 
constitutionality of legislative prayer is recognized as a sui generis legal question.  Snyder v. 
Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1231 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc).  
To this day, Marsh v. Chambers stands as the seminal case on legislative prayer and must 
be considered in any analysis regarding the constitutionality of a legislative body’s prayer 
practice.  In Marsh, this Court examined a state legislature’s practice of opening each of its 
sessions with a prayer led by a chaplain paid from public funds.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784.  It 
concluded that legislative prayer practices that neither proselytize nor advance one faith over 
another do not violate the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 795-96.  In its review of the legislature’s 
6 
 
practice, this Court emphasized the longstanding tradition of American legislatures opening 
meetings with invocational prayers.  Id. at 786-90.  That tradition began in the First Congress, 
which was made up of many of the country’s Founding Fathers and the very draftsmen of the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights.  Id. at 787-88.  Recognizing that members of the First 
Congress voted in favor of appointing a paid congressional chaplain during the same week they 
voted to approve the daft of the First Amendment, this Court aptly concluded that those members 
of the First Congress could not be understood as interpreting or intending the Establishment 
Clause to prohibit legislative prayer.  Id. at 790.  As evidenced by the unbroken history of the 
practice in federal, state and local legislatures for more than 200 years, a consensus has long 
existed as to the constitutionality of legislative prayer.  Id. at 792.  According to this Court, such 
long-standing traditions should be protected and preserved, not lightly cast aside.  See Walz v. 
Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).   
This Court demonstrated such protection of a long-standing tradition in Marsh when it 
declined to apply, as the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had, the strict three-part test of 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), to determine the constitutionality of the Nebraska 
Legislature’s prayer practice.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786.  The three elements of the Lemon test, 
which was the prevailing standard applied to Establishment Clause cases at the time, required the 
government’s actions (1) maintain a secular legislative purpose, (2) have a principal or primary 
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) avoid fostering excessive government 
entanglement with religion.  Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.  Under the Lemon test, the Nebraska 
Legislature’s prayer practice in Marsh would have clearly been unconstitutional.  By relaxing the 
standard applicable to legislative prayer cases in its seminal case on the issue, this Court 
indicated its view of the importance of protecting and preserving legislative prayer practices.  A 
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new and more broadly-drawn line for legislative prayer cases was established in Marsh so that 
all legislative prayer practices that stop short of either proselytizing or advancing one religion at 
the expense of others may be upheld under the Establishment Clause.  See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 
795-96.   
B. Application of the affiliation standard better conforms to the broad standard 
set forth by this Court in Marsh. 
 
The proscription against proselytizing or advancing one religion over another is broad for 
the purpose of allowing various legislative prayer practices around the county to withstand 
constitutional scrutiny.  The correct legal standard to apply in legislative prayer cases is that 
which most closely adheres to the broad guidelines set forth by this Court in Marsh.     
The Ninth Circuit has read Marsh as requiring an inquiry into whether the government 
has either deliberately or through implication placed its imprimatur on a particular faith or 
religion.  Rubin v. City of Lancaster, 710 F.3d 1087, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 2013 
WL 3789507 (Oct. 7, 2013) (quoting Joyner, 653 F.3d at 362 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting)).  In 
Rubin, the Ninth Circuit examined the acts of a city council to determine if the council had 
proactively taken steps to affiliate with one religion over others, applying what may 
appropriately be called the affiliation standard.  Id. at 1097.  Under the affiliation standard, a 
legislative body that, through its prayer practice, has taken steps to affiliate itself with a certain 
religion has crossed the line and begun to advance that religion over others, violating the 
Establishment Clause.  Id.  The affiliation to any religious organization or doctrine standard used 
by the Ninth Circuit was previously established by this Court.  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 590. 
Unlike other standards employed by the circuits, the affiliation standard places the crux 
of a court’s consideration of a prayer practice’s constitutionality on the actions and intent of the 
legislative body under review.  This not only encourages legislatures that would fall under such a 
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standard of review to carefully craft a neutral policy, but it also provides for an objective 
consideration of a prayer practice that can more easily be applied uniformly to future legislative 
prayer cases.   
In Rubin, the Ninth Circuit upheld the city council’s prayer practice even though most 
prayers were Christian because the council had developed a prayer policy that was carefully 
crafted to ensure its own evenhandedness and avoid violating the Establishment Clause.  Rubin, 
710 F.3d at 1097.  The council had taken steps to be inclusive, and the fact that most prayers 
were Christian was merely a reflection of the city’s demographics and a function of the religious 
leaders who chose to respond to the city’s invitations.  Id. at 1098.   
This country has long appreciated the highly-regarded principle of protecting diversity.  
Indeed, a primary aim of the First Amendment is to protect diversity of ideas and opinions 
generally and of religious beliefs specifically.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I.  When such a benign 
factor as local demographics is the primary reason for a majority of the prayers representing one 
religion, it would go against reason and this Court’s precedent to indiscriminately toss out the 
entire prayer practice.  See Joyner, 653 F.3d at 363 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).   
The clear directive of Marsh is that the government may not proselytize or advance one 
religion over others.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795-96.  Where a legislature has not crossed this line in 
its prayer practice, it has not violated the Establishment Clause.  See id.  The affiliation standard 
employed by the Ninth Circuit closely adheres to the legislative prayer guidelines established in 
and required by Marsh without arbitrarily adding considerations that would narrow the scope of 





C. The Second Circuit’s totality of the circumstances test requires 
impermissible parsing of the language of legislative prayers and undermines 
the efforts of legislatures that actively maintain neutral policies. 
 
Every legislative prayer practice must fall within the bounds set by Marsh, which remains 
a fixed point within this Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 
786; Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 28 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2388 
(May 20, 2013).  In their efforts to define those bounds, some circuits have adopted standards 
that arbitrarily narrow the scope of constitutionality outlined in Marsh.  The Second Circuit’s 
totality of circumstances test provides an example.   
In Galloway v. Town of Greece, the Second Circuit faced a case of first impression on the 
constitutionality of a particular legislative prayer practice.  Id. at 26.  It adopted a totality of the 
circumstances test to determine the constitutionality of the Town of Greece’s prayer policy.  Id. 
at 29.  That test required the court to decide whether the town’s practice, viewed in its totality 
from the standpoint of an ordinary, reasonable observer, conveyed the view that the town favored 
or disfavored certain religious beliefs.  Id.  In so doing, the court reviewed the selection process 
of the prayer-givers, the content of the prayers and the actions and inactions of town officials and 
invited prayer givers to hold the town’s prayer practice unconstitutional.  Id. at 30.   
One of the elements the court examined was the sectarian nature of some of the prayers.  
See id. at 31.  Notably, the court acknowledged that major problems arise when an emphasis is 
placed on an examination of the prayers’ sectarian or nonsectarian nature.  Id. at 28.  The court 
correctly recognized that this Court has explicitly ruled that a government may not establish an 
official or civic religion in an effort to avoid an Establishment Clause violation.  Id. at 29 
(quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992)).  Prohibiting prayer givers from mentioning 
any sectarian figures would tend to make a prayer civic, and not religious, in nature, and the 
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Establishment Clause does not prohibit governmental bodies from participating in actions that 
harmonize with religious canons.  McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 462 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring).  However, establishing a vague theistic or civic religion is itself a violation of the 
Establishment Clause.  Lee, 505 U.S. at 590. 
Requiring legislative prayers to not include any sectarian references is not required by 
either Marsh or Allegheny.  Rubin, 710 F.3d at 1094.  This makes practical sense.  A Christian 
prayer will necessarily reference God and Jesus, just as a Muslim prayer will likely reference 
Allah.  Requiring clergy members from these and other faiths to remove such references would 
strip away any meaning and purpose of their prayers.   
Requiring legislative prayer leaders to make no sectarian references is too strict a 
requirement and one that goes beyond the standards required by this Court in Marsh.  
Furthermore, a focus on the content of legislative prayers necessarily violates the proscription in 
Marsh that if the prayer opportunity is not being used to proselytize or advance one religion over 
another, the court is not to evaluate or parse the content of particular prayers.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 
795.  This proscription has been reaffirmed as making “perfect sense” in more recent cases, as it 
would place the court in a role it cannot and should not serve.  See Joyner, 653 F.3d at 351; 
Rubin, 710 F.3d at 1100.   
The totality of the circumstances test is also problematic because of its emphasis on the 
effect of the policy without equal consideration given to the efforts to maintain neutrality in the 
policy.  Legislatures can exercise abundant control over the neutrality of their prayer policies.  
They cannot, however, exercise such control over the religious backgrounds of the individuals 
who choose to accept their invitations to participate in prayer opportunities.  It should not be 
forgotten that when a legislative body utilizes a neutral policy that is proactively inclusive, the 
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prayers will naturally reflect the religions of the prayer leaders and not the preferences of the 
legislative body.  Joyner, 653 F.3d at 363 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).  To punish legislatures by 
banning their prayer practices for something so out of their control as the community’s 
demographics would be to ban legitimate prayer practices where such a ban is not warranted by 
this Court.  See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794.  
Furthermore, the totality of the circumstances test is highly subjective and thus more 
malleable and more likely to be applied differently throughout the nation’s courts.  The result 
would be uncertainty for legislative bodies that are interested in maintaining constitutionally 
sound prayer practices, which this Court has recognized is a legitimate right of American 
governmental bodies.  Id. at 792; Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602; Joyner, 653 F.3d at 346.   
D. The Fourth Circuit’s frequency test demands impermissible parsing of the 
language of legislative prayers and narrows the scope of what constitutes a 
valid legislative prayer practice under Marsh.   
 
The Fourth Circuit, like the Second Circuit, has also adopted a test that narrows the 
bounds of Marsh.  On multiple occasions, the Fourth Circuit has used a frequency test related to 
references of sectarian figures in legislative prayers to hold certain legislative prayer practices 
unconstitutional.  Joyner, 653 F.3d at 352; Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 298-99 
(4th Cir. 2004).  Both in Joyner v. Forsyth County and in Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, the 
court held the respective prayer policies unconstitutional largely because of the frequent 
references to Christian figures.  Joyner, 653 F.3d at 352; Wynne, 376 F.3d at 298-99.   
In Joyner, the court went a step further and said Forsyth County should have proactively 
discouraged references to sectarian figures in its legislative prayers.  Joyner, 653 F.3d at 353.  
However, proactively discouraging references to sectarian figures is a much more restrictive 
standard than that ever imposed on legislative prayer practices by this Court.  See Marsh, 463 
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U.S. at 794-95.  To the contrary, this Court has stated that the government should ordinarily not 
have any role in determining the content of public prayers.  Lee, 505 U.S. at 588.   
The Fourth Circuit has interpreted the Establishment Clause as requiring legislative 
prayers to embrace a non-sectarian ideal.  Joyner, 653 F.3d at 347.  See Simpson v. Chesterfield 
Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 278 (4th Cir. 2005).  It has explicitly stated that it only 
approves legislative prayer when it is nonsectarian in both policy and practice.  Id. at 348.  
However, this Court has never held that such a narrow scope is required for legislative prayer 
practices to be constitutional.  Indeed, this Court held that even the nonsectarian prayer at issue 
in Lee v. Weisman violated the Establishment Clause.  Lee, 505 U.S. at 581.  Reviewing Marsh 
as informed by Lee and Allegheny, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the major cases decided 
by this Court that inform legislative prayer jurisprudence do not direct courts to inquire into the 
content of prayers unless and until the prayer opportunity has been exploited to advance a 
particular religious belief.  Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., 547 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008).  
Although this Court considered the nonsectarian nature of the chaplain’s prayers in Marsh, the 
nonsectarian nature of the prayers did not form the basis for any bright-line rule.  Id.  The Fourth 
Circuit, having implemented such a narrow standard, seems to be creating its own limitations on 
legislative prayer policies, and these limitations go far beyond the requirements established by 
this Court.   
The most appropriate policy a legislative body can take to avoid proselytizing or 
advancing one religion over others is to accept and welcome any volunteer from an established, 





II. MARTIN COUNTY BOARD’S LEGISLATIVE PRAYER PRACTICE DOES NOT 
VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
 
A. Under the affiliation standard, Martin County Board’s legislative prayer 
practice is constitutional. 
 
In Rubin, the city council did not require attendees to participate in the prayers, the prayer 
leaders were not paid for their invocations, members of the council did not preview or involve 
themselves in the content of the prayers and the prayer givers were invited off of a list that 
included congregations of numerous denominations within the city’s limits.  Rubin, 710 F.3d at 
1097-98.  Martin County Board’s prayer practice is nearly identical to the city council practice 
upheld in Rubin under the affiliation standard.   
The Board proactively pursued an inclusive and neutral policy that was open to members 
of any local congregation.  The list it maintained and used throughout its invitation process was 
consistently updated so as not to exclude parties who may have been interested in offering a 
prayer at an upcoming meeting.  The same list was organized alphabetically and congregations 
were not grouped off according to their denominations.  Furthermore, the Board purposefully 
avoided setting up strict guidelines for the prayers, specifically regarding the prayers’ content.  
Other than to limit their allotted time to give the prayer to five minutes, the Board in no way 
attempted to control the actions or words of the prayer.  This hands-off approach tends to show 
that the words of the prayer leaders were their own and were not being used by the Board to 
proselytize or advance any one religion.  The Board also excluded the prayer content from its 
official meeting minutes, further illustrating an attempt to avoid unconstitutional affiliation with 
a religion.  
According to Anne Dhaliwal, the frequency of Christian prayers at the Board’s meetings 
was offensive.  However, Anne Dhaliwal has shown no evidence to support a finding that the 
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frequency of Christian prayers resulted from an unconstitutional act by the Board and not merely 
a result of Martin County’s demographics.  Unless Anne Dhaliwal can show the Board engaged 
in purposeful discrimination, her point is moot.  See Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1281.  
Under the affiliation standard, Martin County Board’s efforts to maintain a neutral prayer 
policy tend to show no attempted affiliation with Christianity over other religions, faiths or 
beliefs, thus the Board’s policy should be deemed valid under the Establishment Clause. 
B. Martin County Board’s legislative prayer policy also withstands 
constitutional scrutiny under either the totality of the circumstances test or 
the frequency test. 
 
If this Court adopts the totality of the circumstances test, an element of Martin County 
Board’s prayer policy that merits consideration is the Board’s purpose behind the practice.  
According to the Board, it has maintained its practice to bring together members of the 
community prior to engaging in important lawmaking efforts.  This Court has recognized the 
legitimacy of using legislative prayer to solemnize the task of governance.  McGowan, 366 U.S. 
at 442.  Other considerations under the totality of the circumstances test will include a review of 
the invitation process, the content of the prayers and the actions of the board members and prayer 
leaders.  When observing these elements of the Board’s prayer practice all together, a reasonable 
observer would not conclude that the Board attempted to proselytize or advance any one religion 
over others.  The Board opened the prayer opportunities up to a variety of religious 
denominations and treated the volunteers equally at the meetings.  It also did not make the 
prayers a part of its official business of government by excluding the prayers from official Board 
meeting minutes.   
If this Court deems the frequency test as the appropriate legal standard, it is important to 
note that the Court’s own precedent will prohibit a parsing of the legislative prayer language for 
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sectarian references unless and until it has established that Martin County Board’s practice 
proselytized or advanced one religion over others.  In the instant case, Martin County Board did 
not cross this threshold under any of the available legal standards.  Utilizing the frequency 
standard to parse the content of the prayers given is, therefore, not appropriate.  Marsh, 463 U.S. 
at 794-95.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners Martin County and Martin County Board request 
this Court reverse the judgment of the Seventeenth Circuit Court of Appeals and render judgment 
in favor of Petitioners Martin County and Martin County Board.  
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